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Strategic Comity 
Angela Huyue Zhang* 
 
 
 
The determination of the extent to which US courts should enforce antitrust law against 
state-led export cartels has been a subject of intense debate among academics and 
policymakers for decades.  As defendants in those cases often invoke comity-related 
defenses, the outcomes of these cases have turned on fact-specific inquiries into the 
reach and meaning of foreign laws, and the foreign sovereign’s involvement in the 
cartels. In the vitamin C case, the Second Circuit avoided this complicated factual 
inquiry by deferring to the statements of the Chinese government and abstained from 
exercising jurisdiction on the ground of comity.  This article focuses on resolving two 
unanswered questions left by the court.  The first is the level of deference that should 
be given to the statements of the foreign sovereign about the interpretation of its own 
laws, and the other is about the proper balancing test for comity analysis.  Incorporating 
insights from game theory, this article argues that both issues need to be examined in 
light of the specific context of state-led export cartels, where the issues of antitrust law 
are closely entangled with trade policy and domestic politics in both the exporting and 
importing countries.  Therefore, even if there is a strong economic rationale for the 
deference to a foreign sovereign’s statements, its appearance in court is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for the United States to grant immunity to foreign 
firms.  Instead, comity analysis needs to be robust enough to accommodate and adapt 
to the changing economic and political circumstances.  As illustrated by the US’ 
response to Japanese export cartels in the 1980s, a sole focus on the factual inquiry of 
the conflict of law is misleading, and may hamper the court’s adoption of optimal 
solutions to such cases.  The findings of this article therefore suggest that US courts 
should accord a high level of deference to the executive branch in cases involving state-
lead export cartels.  In November 2017, the executive branch filed an amicus brief to 
the Supreme Court objecting to the Second Circuit’s conclusive deference to the 
MOFCOM’s statements.  The Supreme Court would be wise to heed this advice.  
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I. Introduction 
The determination of the extent to which US courts should enforce antitrust law against 
state-led export cartels has been the subject of intense debate among academics and 
policymakers.1  As defendants in those cartel cases often argued that their conduct was 
compelled by the foreign government,  these cases have turned on fact-specific 
inquiries into the reach and meaning of foreign laws and the foreign sovereign’s 
involvement in the cartel.2  The underlying rationale for such a defense is based on 
comity, a foundational doctrine applied by US courts to recognize an individual’s act 
under foreign law. 3   Although comity was frequently invoked in cases involving 
conflict of laws with foreign nations, courts and commentators have consistently 
bemoaned its ambiguity and its inconsistent application.4  Indeed, for decades, courts 
have tried in vain to define a limit in determining whether a foreign sovereign’s 
involvement rose to the level of compulsion.5  A case involving a number of vitamin C 
exporters from China highlights these challenges.   
 
On September 20, 2016, the Second Circuit vacated a $147 million District Court 
judgment against two Chinese exporters of vitamin C on the grounds of international 
comity.6  This case dates back to 2005, when a group of US purchasers of Chinese 
vitamin C alleged that the Chinese manufacturers’ swift rise to dominance of the global 
market for vitamin C was facilitated by collusion among the defendants.7  The Chinese 
defendants did not deny the allegations, but moved to dismiss the suit on the basis that 
they should be exempt from antitrust liability because they were compelled by the 
Chinese government to fix prices and limit output.8  In an unprecedented move, the 
Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM) filed an amicus 
brief in support of the Chinese defendants, acknowledging that the Chinese government 
had compelled the cartel.9  The MOFCOM claimed that the trade association that had 
facilitated the cartel was actually an entity under the government’s direct and active 
supervision.10  However, after lengthy discovery, the District Court refused to defer to 
the MOFCOM’s interpretation of Chinese law.11  The Second Circuit reversed the 
                                                 
1 See Jane Lee, Note, Vitamin "C" is for Compulsion: Delimiting the Foreign Sovereign Compulsion 
Defense, 50 VA.J. INT'L L. 757, 759 (2010). See also Marek Martyniszyn, Foreign State’s 
Entanglement in Anticompetitive Conduct, 40 WORLD COMPETITION 299, 306-7 (2017).  
2 Lee, supra note 1, at 759.  
3 In re: Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 837 F. 3d 175, 183 (2016). 
4 William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2072 (2015). 
(“For a principle that plays such a central role in U.S. foreign relations law, international comity is 
surrounded by a surprising amount of confusion.”) 
5 Id. at 790.  
6 837 F. 3d 175, at 175.  
7 In re: Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).(Plaintiffs brought suit 
under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.)  
8 Id. at 550. 
9 Id. at 552. 
10 Id. 
11 In re: Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, at 557.  
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decision of the lower court, and afforded conclusive weight to the statements by the 
Chinese government.12  
 
In April 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, asking 
the Court to clarify, among others, two important issues.13  The first issue is the level 
of deference given to a foreign government’s interpretation of its own law—specifically, 
whether a court should give conclusive deference to a foreign government’s 
interpretation of its own law if the government has appeared in court.14  The second 
issue is how to resolve the longstanding split among Circuits Courts in determining 
how to apply the international comity doctrine.15  In this case, the Second Circuit has 
applied a form of a balancing test adopted by the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit, 
but other circuits have considered different versions of the test.16  The Second Circuit 
also left open the issue of whether conflict of law is a prerequisite for the application 
of the comity doctrine.  On January 12, 2018, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
this case. 17 
 
This article aims to tackle these two problems.  By incorporating insights from game 
theory, the article explores the economic rationale behind the deference to foreign 
sovereigns and the comity doctrine.  It argues that both issues need to be examined in 
light of the specific context of state-led export cartels, where the issues of antitrust law 
are closely entangled with trade policy and domestic politics in both the exporting and 
importing countries.  In particular, the article finds that a foreign sovereign’s 
appearance in court helps fill in an information gap by signaling its role in organizing 
the export cartel.  As the foreign sovereign and its exporters are engaged in a repeated 
game, the foreign sovereign has strong incentives to appear in a US court to defend its 
domestic exporters.  Failure to do so will harm its reputation and hurt its credibility.  
Moreover, the cost for foreign exporters to solicit support from their government is 
lower in the case of a genuine state-led export cartel than a sham one.  On the other 
hand, the article argues that US courts need not give conclusive weight to the statements 
of a foreign sovereign.  Rather, whether the foreign sovereign’s statements should be 
accorded conclusive weight is a strategic decision that also depends on the availability 
and cost of alternative forms of remedies, such as trade.    
 
                                                 
12 837 F. 3d 175, at 175. 
13 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,  On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,  837 F. 3d 175 (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 1353281 (April 3, 2017) [hereinafter 
Petition for Certiorari] ; see also Reply to Brief in Opposition, On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. 
Hebei Welcome Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,  837 F. 3d 175 (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 2610072 (June 13, 
2017). [hereinafter Reply to Brief in Opposition]. 
14 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 13, at 23-29. 
15 Id., at 29-34. See also Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 11-12. 
16 Reply to Brief in Opposition, supra note 13, at 12. (“Five circuits each employ five distinct versions 
of such a “balancing test,” each considering anywhere from three to ten factors.”). 
17 Brent Kendall, Supreme Court To Consider Civil Price-Fixing Case Against Chinese Vitamin C 
Makers, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 12, 2018), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-to-consider-civil-
price-fixing-case-against-chinese-vitamin-c-makers-1515787160  
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Second, in deciding how to respond to state-led export cartels, the United States does 
not act alone.  Its choices closely interact with the decisions of the exporting country, 
whose conduct will in turn have implications on the interests of the United States.  To 
illustrate this dynamic, this article models their interactions as a sequential game.  In 
this game, the exporting country makes the first move of deciding whether to impose 
export restraint and then the United States responds by deciding whether to grant 
immunity based on comity ground.  The optimal strategy of the United States is 
contingent on the strategy of the exporting country, whose strategy is also dependent 
on both the United States’ and its own domestic politics and trade policy.  Accordingly, 
the United States’ best response to a state-led export cartel not only turns on a 
calculation of its own payoffs from competition, trade, and politics, but also on a careful 
assessment of the strategic moves of the exporting country.  However, judicial response 
to state-led export cartels has often been static and judges fail to appreciate the dynamic 
features of these cases.  Judges also tend to fixate their attention on the antitrust case at 
issue while giving inadequate consideration to the other dimensions, such as trade and 
politics.  Indeed, whether a US court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction 
should depend on the specific circumstances of the particular case, taking into 
consideration the interests of all players involved while recognizing the strategic nature 
of their decision-making.  This explains why US courts have struggled to define a limit 
to comity-based defense for decades.  In fact, any balancing test that solely focuses on 
the factual inquiry of the conflict of law is misleading, and may hamper the court from 
adopting an optimal solution to the export cartels.   
 
One caveat must be entered here.  In this article, we assume that each country is a 
rational, single actor with a coherent goal to maximize its own payoffs. Therefore, the 
issue of separation of power in dealing with state-led export cartels is beyond the scope 
of this article.  However, these are important issues that deserved academic and policy 
attention.  
 
The article is organized as follows. Section II introduces the background of the vitamin 
C case.  Section III & IV incorporate the insights from game theory to explain two 
unresolved questions in the case.  Applying the signaling theory, Section III explains 
the economic rationale for deference to the statements of a foreign sovereign of its own 
interpretation of its law.  It then examines the optimal strategy for the United States in 
deciding whether to defer to such statements.  Section IV models the interaction 
between the importing country and exporting country as a sequential game, and 
analyzes their moves in their game.  Using the example of the Japanese automobile 
export cartels, it shows that when there is an incentive compatibility between the 
exporting country and the United States, comity should be granted even in the absence 
of a conflict of law.  This section also provides a critical review of the judicial response 
to Japanese export cartels.  Section V concludes and draws implications for this study.    
 
II. The Vitamin C Saga 
In January 2005, a group of US purchasers filed claims against Chinese manufacturers 
of vitamin C, accusing them of fixing prices and limiting the quantity of sales of vitamin 
C to the United States.18 The cases were subsequently consolidated in New York federal 
                                                 
18 837 F. 3d 175, at 179. 
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court.19  The plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had colluded with the Chamber of 
Commerce of Medicines and Health Products Importers and Exporters (“the Chamber”) 
and agreed to limit the production of vitamin C and increase its prices to create a supply 
shortage in the international market.20  The defendants did not deny that they had fixed 
prices.21  However, they contended that they had acted pursuant to Chinese regulations 
regarding export pricing and that the Chamber is a government-supervised entity 
through which the Chinese government had compelled their collusion. 22   The 
defendants then moved to dismiss the claims on the basis of three defenses based on 
comity: (1) the act of state doctrine, under which courts should refrain from judging the 
acts of the states; (2) the foreign sovereign compulsion, under which courts should 
abstain from exercising jurisdiction in cases in which the defendants’ conduct is 
compelled by the government; and (3) the international comity doctrine, under which 
courts should decline from exercising jurisdiction in cases that might influence the 
working relationships among nations.23    
 
i. The District Court’s Decision 
At the heart of the analysis by the District Court of the application of the above comity-
based doctrines is the factual inquiry of “whether the Chinese government required 
defendants to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act.”24   That is, whether the 
defendants’ behavior was actually compelled by a foreign sovereign.25  In an unusual 
move, the MOFCOM filed an amicus brief in 2006 in support of these Chinese 
defendants and acknowledged that the challenged conduct was directed by a regulatory 
pricing scheme. 26   The MOFCOM is the highest central ministry in charge of 
overseeing international trade in China.27   The appearance of the MOFCOM as a 
litigant in a US court is unprecedented.28   
 
In its submission, the MOFCOM declared that it had created the Chamber in order to 
exercise its authority to cut prices and limit production of vitamin C.29  The MOFCOM 
explained that the Chamber was a government-supervised entity, unlike those trade 
associations in the United States.30  According to the MOFCOM’s amicus brief,  the 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 180. 
21 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, at 525. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. at 550-52.  
24 Id. at 552.  
25 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies and Restraints of Trade § 334 (2009). 
26 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, at 552. 
27 Id. 
28 Id.  It should be noted, however, that it is common practice for other foreign states to submit amicus 
curiae briefs in antitrust cases before the US courts.  See Marek Martyniszyn, Foreign States’ Amicus 
Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases, 61 ANTITRUST BULL. 611 (2016). 
29 584 F. Supp. 2d 546, at 552-3. 
30 Id. at 552. 
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MOFCOM and the State Drug Administration issued a notice mandating strict control 
of vitamin C products in 1997 in response to the tough competition on the global 
market.31  The notice required the Chamber to establish a vitamin C Coordination 
Group, subsequently called Vitamin C Sub-Committee.32  Pursuant to the Charter of 
the Sub-Committee, only members of the subsection-committee have the right to export 
vitamin C and they need to strictly follow the export coordinated prices set by the 
Chamber.33  The penalty for non-compliance is severe; the Chamber could provide 
“warning, open criticism and even revocation of…membership,” and may even advise 
the relevant government department to suspend or cancel the producers’ export rights.34  
After China’s accession into the WTO, the Chamber adopted a new system of 
mandatory “advance approval” in 2002, whereby trade associations must sign off on 
export contracts before those goods can be released for export.35   
 
The District Court asserted that the MOFCOM’s statements were entitled to substantial 
deference, but found that the record contained conflicting evidence as to whether the 
Chinese defendants’ actions were compelled by the Chinese government.36  The Court 
pointed to the Chamber’s own documents, including its statements on the website 
which portrayed the exporters as reaching a “self-regulated” agreement pursuant to 
which they would voluntarily restrict the price and quantity of exports.37  The Court 
then denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss to allow further factual development on 
the issue of compulsion.38  In 2009, the MOFCOM submitted a new statement to the 
District Court in response to the court’s findings, clarifying that “self-discipline does 
not mean complete voluntariness or self-conduct,” but rather it “refers to a system of 
regulation under the supervision of a designated agency acting on behalf of the Chinese 
government.”39  Nonetheless, the District Court accepted the plain language of the 
Chamber’s documents that emphasized the system of self-discipline and voluntariness 
of the export system.40  It refused to defer to the MOFCOM’s interpretation that such 
language needs to be read in the context of China’s regulatory culture.41  After lengthy 
and detailed discovery, the court found that the Chinese government merely encouraged 
the cartel as a policy preference, but that the MOFCOM’s conduct did not rise to the 
level of compelling the vitamin C manufacturers to fix prices.42  It then denied the 
                                                 
31 Id. at 553. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 553-54. 
36 Id. at 557. 
37 Id. at 554-55. 
38 Id. at 559. 
39 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China Statement in In Re Vitamin C Antitrust 
Litigation at 2, In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522 (No. 06-MD- 1738 (DGT)(JO)) 
[hereinafter Ministry's 2009 Statement]. 
40 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litig., 810 F. Supp. 2d 522, 536 & n.17, 542, 551 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
41 810 F. Supp. 2d at 536 & n.17, 542, 551.  
42 Id. at 525, 550 & 552. 
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defendants’ petition for a summary judgment, finding that the defendants were not 
subject to compulsion to fix export prices.43  The Court also held that even if some 
compulsion existed, the defendants went beyond the requirements of the Chinese 
government and set prices above those necessary to achieve the government’s goals.44 
The case then went to trial and the jury subsequently decided that the Chinese 
defendants had violated the US antitrust law, and awarded $54.1 million in damages to 
the plaintiff, which was later trebled by the judge.45   
 
ii. The Second Circuit’s Decision 
On appeal, the Second Circuit considered a ten-factor balancing test in evaluating 
whether the District Court should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction on 
international comity ground.46  The Second Circuit relied upon the balancing test set 
out by the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America47  and the Third 
Circuit in Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.48   In both cases, the courts 
recognized the need to weigh the interests of the United States against the 
countervailing interests of the foreign entity when determining whether to exert 
jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct affecting US commerce.49  The Second Circuit 
combined and summarized the enumerated factors as follows: “(1) Degree of conflict 
with foreign law or policy; (2) Nationality of the parties, locations or principal places 
of business of corporations; (3) Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct 
here as compared with conduct abroad; (4) The extent to which enforcement by either 
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the availability of a remedy abroad and 
the pendency of litigation there; (5) Existence of intent to harm or affect American 
commerce and its foreseeability; (6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court 
exercises jurisdiction and grants relief; (7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be 
placed in the position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be 
under conflicting requirements by both countries; (8) Whether the court can make its 
order effective; (9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if 
made by the foreign nation under similar circumstances; and (10) Whether a treaty with 
the affected nations has addressed the issue.”50   
 
The Second Circuit then cited the US Supreme Court’s ruling in Hartford Fire Insurance 
Co. v. California, and focused primarily on the first factor, that is, the degree of conflict 
between the US and foreign law.51  In a departure from the District Court, which 
focuses its analysis on a factual inquiry into the existence of compulsion by the Chinese 
government, the Second Circuit gave conclusive deference to the official statements by 
                                                 
43 Id. at 524-25. 
44  Id. at 560-61, 566. 
45 837 F. 3d 175, at 178. 
46 Id. at 184. 
47 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 614–15 (9th Cir. 1976). 
48  Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297–98 (3d Cir. 1979).  
49 837 F. 3d 175, at 184. 
50 Id. at 185. 
51 Id.  
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the MOFCOM.52  It noted that US courts are bound to defer to such official statements 
when a foreign government directly participates in a US court proceeding and there is 
reasonable evidence under the circumstances presented.53  The Second Circuit asserted 
that it was unable to identify a single case “where a foreign sovereign appeared before 
a U.S. tribunal and the U.S. tribunal adopted a reading of that sovereign’s law contrary 
to that sovereign’s interpretation of them.”54  As the Court continued: “Not extending 
deference in these circumstances disregard and unravels the tradition of according 
respect to a foreign government’s explication of its own laws, the same respect and 
treatment that we would expect our government to receive in comparable matters before 
a foreign court.” 55   In a footnote, the Second Circuit also mentioned the 
counterfactual—had the Chinese government not chosen to appear in the litigation, the 
District Court’s fact-specific approach would have been entirely appropriate.56  Thus, 
it appears that the Chinese government’s appearance in this case played a decisive role 
in influencing the outcome of the case.   
 
Additionally, the Second Circuit’s decision included a lengthy recitation of the adverse 
consequences that had resulted from the District Court’s disregard of the MOFCOM’s 
statements.57  Thus, it appears that the Chinese government’s reaction was one of the 
important components of the court’s comity analysis.  The Court also noted that even 
though the plaintiffs may not be able to obtain remedy under Sherman Act, they could 
make complaints to the executive branch of the government and the WTO processes.58  
Ultimately, the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the lower court, arguing that it 
should abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in this case because the Chinese 
government filed a formal statement admitting the compulsion, and because defendants 
could not simultaneously comply with Chinese law and US antitrust law.59   
 
In April 2017, the plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, asking 
the court to clarify several issues, including the standard of deference to foreign 
sovereign’s interpretation of its own laws and the appropriate balancing test for 
applying the comity defense. 60 On June 26, 2017, the Supreme Court invited Acting 
Solicitor General Jeffery Wall to file a brief expressing the views of the United States 
in the vitamin C case.61  On November 14, 2017, the US Solicitor General and the 
                                                 
52 Id. at 186-94.  
53 Id. at 189. 
54 Id.   
55 Id  
56 Id 191 & n. 10. (“We note that if the Chinese Government had not appeared in this litigation, the 
district court’s careful and thorough treatment of the evidence before it in analyzing what Chinese law 
required at both the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stages would have been entirely 
appropriate.”)  
57 Id. 193-94.  
58 Id. 194. 
59 Id.  
60 Petition for Certiorari, supra note 13. 
61 Shepard Goldfein & James Keyte, Vitamin C Litigation: Window Into Trump White House 
International Relations? 258 NY L. J. (July 18, 2017),: 
http://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202793176725/?slreturn=20170931015948 
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Department of Justice submitted their amicus brief to the Supreme Court, arguing that 
the Second Circuit erred by treating the MOFCOM’s statements as conclusive.62   
 
iii. The WTO Case and Other Chinese Export Cartels  
As the antitrust case against the Chinese vitamin C producers was progressing at the 
District Court, China received another blow on the trade front.  In 2009, the United 
States launched a WTO suit against China for the violation of its WTO commitments 
by imposing export restraints on certain raw materials.63 The manufacturers in the 
WTO case were all members of the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals, 
and Chemicals Importers and Exporters (“CCCMC”).64  Although the WTO proceeding 
involved different export goods and a different trade association, the US trade 
representatives used the MOFCOM’s statements in the vitamin C case as evidence that 
the Chinese government imposed “minimum export price requirements.”65  The United 
States argued that such export restraints violate China’s WTO obligations under GATT, 
as well as China’s Accession Protocol.66  These arguments were upheld by the WTO 
panel, which ruled in July 2011 that China’s export restraints violated its WTO 
commitment. 67   It concluded that the Chinese government had acted through the 
CCCMC to coordinate the export prices for certain raw materials,  and explicitly relied 
on the MOFCOM’s statements in the vitamin C case in doing so.68  In 2012, on appeal 
by the parties, the WTO’s Appellate Body significantly modified the decision of the 
original panel.69  On the one hand, it concluded that China’s export control measures, 
including export duties and quotas on nine industrial raw materials, violated the WTO 
requirements.70  On the other hand, it vacated some of the panel’s rulings on the ground 
                                                 
 
62 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, On Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Animal Science Products, Inc., et al. v. Hebei Welcome 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd.,  837 F. 3d 175 (No. 16-1220), 2017 WL 5479477 (Nov. 14, 2017). 
[hereinafter the United States’ Amicus Brief in Vitamin C Case] 
63 China- Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, WTO [hereinafter WTO, 
Exportation of Various Raw Materials], http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu.e/cases e/ds394 
e.htm 
64 Id.  
65 First Written Submission of the United States of America, China-Measures Related to the 
Exportation of Various Raw Materials, ¶¶ 207-208, 216, 229, 352, WT/DS394, WT/DS395, 
WT/DS398 June 1, 2010) [hereinafter U.S. First Written Submission], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm-send/1948. 
66 Id. ¶¶10, 15.  
67 Panel Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 7.998, 
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R (July 5, 2011) [hereinafter Panel Report], available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/394 395_398re.pdf. 
68 Id. ¶¶ 7.1005, 7.1006. 
69 Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials, 362-
63, WT/DS394/AB/R, WT/DS395/AB/R, WT/DS398/AB/R (Jan. 30, 2011), available at 
www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispul.e/394-395 398abre.pdf.  
70 Id. ¶¶ 266, 287, 293, 307.  
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of due process, thus voiding the panel’s findings that the Chinese government had 
imposed export price restraints.71   
 
During the trial, the District Court considered the WTO proceeding, but paid little heed 
to the position of the US trade representative.  The District Court emphasized that 
vitamin C was not an export at issue in the WTO proceeding, and the executive branch 
had not requested that the Court accord the MOFCOM’s statements heightened 
deference.72  While noting the findings of the WTO panel, the District Court held that 
their conclusion “did not alter my interpretation of Chinese law,” because the WTO 
findings did not show that China denied the existence of the price restraint, nor did the 
WTO discuss whether the trade association membership was voluntary or not.73  The 
District Court also observed that while the WTO panel defers to the MOFCOM’s 2009 
statements that the vitamin C producers would be subject to penalty for failure to 
participate in price coordination, the panel fails to address the deficiencies with the 
MOFCOM’s filings with the Court.74    
 
When the vitamin C case was pending in front of the District Court, several Chinese 
manufacturers of magnesite and bauxite faced similar antitrust litigations for 
conducting export cartels in the United States.75  In 2005, US purchasers sued Chinese 
exporters of magnesite-based products for price fixing in New Jersey.76  A year later,  
Chinese exporters of bauxite were challenged in Pennsylvania for price-fixing in 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 77   Similar to the vitamin C case, the 
defendants in these two cases did not deny the charges, but sought to dismiss the suit 
on the basis of various doctrines addressing actions by the foreign governments.78  In 
both cases, the defendants allegedly fixed prices and engaged in other anticompetitive 
conduct through the CCCMC, the trade association involved in the WTO proceeding.79  
In fact, both magnesite and bauxite are the raw materials involved in  the WTO 
proceeding.80 
 
                                                 
71 Id. ¶¶  226-235. 
72 810 F. Supp. 2d at 527, 551–60.  
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In these cases, courts exhibited greater weight to the WTO proceeding than the District 
Court in the vitamin C case. 81   In Resco Products, the court decided to stay the 
proceeding pending the  resolution of a US-initiated WTO proceeding against China on 
export constraints for bauxite.82  The court highlighted the striking similarity of factual 
and legal inquiries between its case and the WTO proceeding, noting that that the results 
of the WTO panel would have the potential to provide persuasive support for the act of 
state allegations brought by the defendant.83  The court also exhibited considerable 
deference to separation of powers and sovereignty considerations, noting that to 
advance discovery without a final determination in the WTO proceeding could lead to 
potential conflict with the position of the US government and would interfere with the 
executive branch’s conduct of foreign policy.84  The court further considered judicial 
economy, observing that a wait and see approach would save substantial time, effort, 
and resources.85 
 
Meanwhile, in Animal Science, the court in New Jersey afforded more deference to the 
statements of the Chinese government than the district court in the vitamin C case.86  
The court considered that “a foreign sovereign’s admission of legal compulsion of its 
subjects could warrant a nearly binding-degree of deference, even if the admitted 
compulsion was based on what might be deemed, in American jurisprudence, a form of 
‘unwritten law.’”87  The court also actively researched evidence from other proceedings 
that might bear on the compulsion defense raised by the defendants, including the Resco 
Products case and the vitamin C case.88  Similar to the vitamin C case, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the Chinese defendants were not compelled by the government because 
they were not subject to mandatory law but rather to loose directives issued to the 
chambers.89  But the court viewed the defense “through a comity-driven prism,” calling 
the plaintiff’s position “unduly condescending toward foreign legal regimes.”90  In the 
end, the court was convinced by the totality of the evidence that the trade association 
involved was a government entity, and that the Chinese government had indeed 
compelled the defendant’s conduct.91 
 
The approaches taken by the courts in the raw material cases contrast sharply with that 
adopted by the District Court in the vitamin C case.  It also raises questions about the 
inconsistent standards that courts have applied in deciding how to deal with comity-
                                                 
81  Dingding Tina Wang, When Antitrust Met WTO: Why U.S. Courts Should Consider U.S.-China 
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related defense.  The District Court’s decision in the vitamin C case is controversial, 
and many commentators have criticized the court for its failure to consider its 
implications on American trade policy.92  As such, the Second Circuit’s decision to 
defer to the MOFCOM’s statements has been applauded as a sensible solution to the 
vexing issue involving trade and antitrust, and its analysis on the comity doctrine is also 
heralded as the most important development of the comity doctrine in decades.93  
However, the Second Circuit left open two unresolved questions.  First, should a foreign 
government’s statements in court always be deemed conclusive?  Is it true, as the 
Second Circuit hinted, that a fact-specific approach would be required had the foreign 
government not appeared?  Second, what should the appropriate test for comity analysis 
be?  Currently, US courts have adopted different versions of the balancing tests to 
determine whether to abstain from exercising jurisdictions and the Second Circuit left 
open the question of whether conflict of law is a prerequisite for the application of 
comity.  As elaborated below, the economic insights from game theory help enlighten 
us in answering these two difficult questions. 
 
III. The Economic Analysis of Deference 
All courts agree that the statements by foreign sovereigns should be given substantive 
deference, but they disagree on the extent of that deference.94  In United States v. Pink, 
the US Supreme Court was confronted with a case regarding the extraterritorial reach 
of a decree nationalizing Russia’s insurance business.95  The Court considered that the 
Russian government’s declaration as conclusive evidence of the effects of the decree, 
and did not stop to review other evidence.96 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
subsequently adopted in 1966, stipulates that courts in considering foreign laws “may 
consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted 
by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence.” 97   Several courts, 
including the Third Circuit and the Fifth Circuit, have followed Pink and decided that 
official declarations from foreign governments must be accepted as “conclusive.” 98  
The Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission  held that such 
foreign statements are sufficient to establish compulsion, “the representation must 
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contain enough detail to enable the Agencies to see precisely how the compulsion 
would be accomplished under foreign law.”99 
 
On the other hand, other courts have held that courts need not accept such statements 
as conclusive.  For instance, the Sixth100 and D.C. Circuit101 performed an independent 
analysis of foreign law, regardless of a foreign sovereign’s contrary arguments.102 The 
Eleventh Circuit held that while a foreign government’s amicus brief is a logical place 
to look for reliable and accurate information, it is not entitled to conclusive 
deference.103  The Seventh Circuit also applied a flexible standard of deference, holding 
that it would defer to a foreign sovereign’s proffered interpretation of its own law where 
the foreign government had appeared in federal court and its interpretation was both 
plausible and consistent with its stated views through many years of domestic and 
international litigations in the subject in question. 104  In a previous decision relating to 
the statements by the Indonesian government, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
government’s amicus brief was entitled to substantial deference, but did not take it as 
conclusive evidence of compulsion.105  This contrasts with its ruling in the vitamin C 
case, in which it held that a US court is bound to defer to the statements of a foreign 
government when it  “directly participates in a US court proceedings,” and its 
interpretation is “reasonable under the circumstances presented.”106   By incorporating 
insights from game theory, the following analysis first explores the economic rationales 
behind deference and then analyzes the optimal level of deference.   
 
i. The Difficulty of the Fact-Specific Approach 
In cases involving export cartels, there is often an information gap between the 
exporting country and the importing country.  Cartels are often conducted secretly and 
it is difficult to obtain evidence of the cartel’s formation.  Moreover, because export 
cartels are organized extraterritorially, it is even more difficult for the importing 
countries to detect the existence of such cartels.  If the defendants attempt to invoke a 
comity-related defense, then US courts and agencies may face the difficult task of 
understanding foreign laws and legal practices.  When the foreign government does not 
impose any mandatory law, there is further ambiguity as to whether the government 
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has actually compelled the action.  The exporting country therefore has superior 
information regarding its participation in the cartel than the United States government.  
These challenges of understanding foreign laws were highlighted by the Second Circuit 
in the vitamin C case.  For instance, the court observed that Chinese law is less 
transparent than those in the United States and other countries. 107   Moreover, the court 
also noted that Chinese legal system is distinct from the US system and it has a vast 
regulatory regime of administrative regulation.108  It also found that the plain language 
of a directive of a government may not accurately reflect the Chinese law, especially 
considering the need for translation and the understanding of the term of arts in the 
Chinese system.109   
 
There are two ways for US courts to fill in this information gap.  One is through trial 
discovery.  But trial discovery is a costly and lengthy process.  For instance, the 
discovery in the vitamin C case lasted for more than five years.  Moreover, ambiguities 
abound as to the authority of the government’s directive and the severity of the 
sanctions. 110   As Waller once acutely observed: “the interaction between the 
government and the private industry spans across a spectrum ranging from compulsory 
orders, backed by civil or criminal sanctions at one end, to purely voluntary requests 
without sanction, at the other end.”111   In practice, US courts have been unclear about 
the required threshold for a foreign sovereign’s involvement in the cartels and have 
taken divergent approaches in deciding these cases.112 
 
The Chinese vitamin C case offers a prime example.  There is no doubt that the 
Chamber was closely involved and facilitated the formation of the cartel, but it is not 
entirely clear whether the government compelled the cartel.  To begin, the cartel was 
organized by a Chamber whose legal status is unclear.  The MOFCOM claimed that the 
Chamber is government-supervised and that the appointment of its staff is government-
controlled.113  It described the Chamber as “the instrumentality through which the 
Ministry oversees and regulates the business of importing and exporting medical 
products in China.” 114  However, plaintiffs challenged the Ministry’s position, arguing 
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that the Chamber was only a non-governmental organization that is independent of the 
government. 115   To buttress their claims, the plaintiffs submitted evidence of the 
Chinese government’s previous public statements extolling the independence of the 
Chamber.116  
 
Another vexing issue is that it was very hard for the court to draw the line between 
voluntary and compulsive conduct.  For instance, upon learning that the EU was 
contemplating antidumping actions against the Chinese producers of vitamin C in the 
fall of 2011, the MOFCOM gave specific instructions to the Chamber to organize firms 
to take active steps to avoid potential antidumping challenges. 117   The Chamber 
subsequently coordinated a meeting with defendants.118  However, the minutes of the 
meetings do not show that the Chamber had compelled these defendants to abide by a 
minimum export price.119 Rather, according to the court’s findings, they suggest that 
the agreement among them was voluntary.120    
 
Further, there was confusion as to whether the Chamber was able to successfully 
enforce the price scheme as claimed by the MOFCOM given the lack of clear penalties 
and sanctions over non-compliance.  The District Court pointed out several ambiguities 
in the MOFCOM’s official statements that raised doubts about the government’s 
compulsion.121  For instance, the court’s discovery revealed that firms are entitled to 
export vitamin C even if they are not members of a subcommittee of the Chamber. 122  
During a meeting held by the Chamber, a representative from the MOFCOM admitted 
that the government’s regulation of the vitamin C industry “ha[d] not been very 
successful.”123  He urged the companies to “consider the interests of the state as a whole” 
rather than simply “maximizing their own profits.” 124   There was also evidence 
showing that those manufacturers who deviated from the minimum price agreed did not 
face any punishment.125   
 
Similarly, there was confusion as to whether the parties actually went significantly 
above the quoted price.126  The District Court found that while the Chamber had been 
charged with the responsibility to coordinate export prices to avoid anti-dumping suits 
and below-cost pricing, the firms themselves enjoy significant discretion in determining 
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their profit margins, and the Ministry in practice did not intervene.127  Therefore, the 
court believed that any compulsion was limited to avoiding anti-dumping and below-
cost pricing.128  The District Court noted that the Chinese government had asserted in 
the WTO proceeding that it had repealed the price restraint system and ceased to impose 
penalty as of May 28, 2008.129 The Chinese government also asserted in the WTO 
proceeding that it gave up the “export administration” of vitamin C as of January 1 
2002. 130  This apparently contradicts with the MOFCOM’s position in the vitamin C 
litigation.131   All these factual inconsistencies ultimately led the District Court to refuse 
to defer to the MOFCOM’s statements.132  In its denial of summary judgment, the 
District Court described the MOFCOM’s 2009 statements as “a carefully crafted and 
phrased litigation position.”133  The District Court even portrayed the MOFCOM’s 
assertion of compulsion as “a post-hoc attempt to shield defendants’ conduct from 
antitrust scrutiny.”134 
 
The difficulty of a factual inquiry of compulsion is not unique to cases involving 
Chinese exporters.  In cases involving Japanese export cartels, US courts have similarly 
struggled to define the boundary between voluntary and compulsive conduct.135  Since 
1980s, the Japanese government had used administrative guidance, a common 
administrative scheme applied by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry 
(MITI) to actively encourage the formation of export cartels. 136   Administrative 
guidance per se is not government regulation and does not involve legal authority for 
enforcement.137  Rather, it refers to the function of an administrative agency to persuade 
and guide a party to conduct its business in a certain way.138 According to Japanese 
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trade specialists, administrative guidance is the crux around which all the legal 
measures for export control revolve.139   It has worked well in Japan and the MITI was 
very successful in achieving compliance with its administrative requests. 140   At least 
two reasons have contributed to its success.  First, the Japanese culture places an 
emphasis on cooperation and avoidance of direct conflicts and Japanese industry 
usually complied with such informal requests and guidance. 141   Second, Japanese 
administrative agencies enjoy significant administrative discretion.142  The MITI, the 
agency in charge of overseeing international trade in Japan, is responsible for enforcing 
about 130 statutes encompassing a wide variety of administrative matters from trade to 
safety standards to pollution control.143  Businesses thus fear the retaliation from the 
MITI if they fail to comply with its directives.144  According to Japanese scholars, a 
refusal to comply with administrative guidance may provoke the government to 
establish formal requests or may even cause businesses to face unfavorable treatment 
in other ways.145  This poses difficulty even for the Japanese courts in deciding whether 
such compliance with administrative guidance is a valid defense for violations of 
Japanese antitrust laws.146 
 
The challenges for courts in taking the fact-specific approach derive from the inherent 
difficulty of identifying the extent of the State’s control over its domestic companies.147  
Even if the State imposes a mandatory export restraint over its own companies, it may 
fail to successfully coordinate an export cartel.  After all, firms that participate in a 
cartel may have incentives to cheat in order to reap more profits.  Thus, the effectiveness 
of the State’s policing system directly impacts the success of the state-led cartel.  On 
the other hand, the State is no ordinary legal actor.  Even if the State does not issue any 
binding administrative law or order, it can threaten to penalize a firm if the firm does 
not voluntarily comply with its request.  In other words, the State could have de facto 
control over the firms, even without clear de jure control.  In the vitamin C case, neither 
the MOFCOM nor any other government department imposed a mandatory 
requirement on the Chinese manufacturers to coordinate prices, but the Chinese 
government may be able to obtain de facto control over these exporters via other 
administrative means.  However, the extent of such de facto control is very elusive for 
a court to discern through discovery, as was revealed in the vitamin C case.   
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ii. The Shortcut of Deference 
The other means by which the Court can fill in the information gap is to rely on the 
foreign sovereign’s interpretation of its own law.  The simplest way for the exporting 
country to convey information to the United States is to directly communicate with it.  
But in a game of strategy, players may be concerned that the other is not telling the 
truth, or that others may not believe them.  If the exporting country and the United 
States have perfectly aligned interests, then direct communication will work well.  If 
the exporting country confesses that it has compelled the export cartel, then the United 
States should grant immunity to the exporters.  If the exporting country denies 
compulsion, the United States will deny immunity to the exporters.  However, in most 
circumstances, the exporting country and the United States may not have perfectly 
aligned interests, they may only have partially aligned interests, or they may even have 
completely conflicting interests.  Moreover, in the game between the exporting country 
and the United States, the exporting country may have the incentive to protect its own 
domestic manufacturers who solicited government statements in the hope of receiving 
immunity from antitrust liabilities.  This is especially true if the direct communication 
from the exporting country has zero or negligible direct cost, which is known as “cheap 
talk” in economics.148  The United States is aware of such incentives to lie and thus will 
not fully trust the words of the exporting country.     
 
In the vitamin C case, the Chinese government chose to file an official declaration and 
appeared in front of the US court to admit its involvement and direction of the vitamin 
C cartel.  Such a form of declaration is not a cheap talk for China.  In fact, admission is 
costly for China.  When an export cartel is led by the State that is a party to the WTO, 
then the State’s action could be a potential violation of its trade commitments.  For 
instance, Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) prohibits 
WTO members from imposing or maintaining import and export restrictions.149  The 
risks of potential violations of the WTO commitments may explain why the MOFCOM 
did not directly and explicitly regulate the exporters, but rather delegated such functions 
to a Chamber whose legal status and legal authority is ambiguous.   
 
From a game theory perspective, the MOFCOM’s appearance in the vitamin C court 
serves the function of sending a signal to the US court in an attempt to persuade the 
court to follow the MOFCOM’s interpretation of the Chinese law.  The signaling theory 
was first developed by Michael Spence in his famous “Job Market Signaling” paper 
published in 1973. 150   In this paper, Spence created a model whereby potential 
employees send a signal about their ability by acquiring education credentials. 151  
Education credentials send a useful signal because employer believes that the credential 
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is positively correlated with the employee’s skills and capability.  As it is more difficult 
for less capable employees to acquire good education credentials, this enables the 
employer to reliably distinguish between the more qualified and less qualified job 
applicants.  Notably, one critical assumption for Spence’s model is that the cost of 
signaling is negatively correlated with the employee’s productive capability.  That is, 
the less competent employees will be less likely to acquire the same education 
credentials than the more competent employees.152 
 
Similar to the context of the job market, the Chinese government’s appearance in the 
vitamin C case sends a useful signal to the US court.  To begin, the Chinese government 
has the incentive to admit that it had imposed export restraints and coordinated the 
export cartels.  For sure, admission carries some cost for China; however, it can 
potentially help the Chinese exporters get exemptions from antitrust violations.  The 
Chinese government and the Chinese exporters are engaged in a repeated game and the 
Chinese government therefore wants to craft a reputation that it is reliable and credible.  
If the Chinese government refuses to defend its own firms in US courts, it would lose 
its credibility among the Chinese exporters.  Knowing that the government would not 
bail them out from antitrust liabilities, the exporters would be less likely to comply with 
the government’s instructions in the future.  To appear credible, the Chinese 
government will choose to defend Chinese manufacturers.  This is not to deny that the 
Chinese government may have an incentive to shield its domestic manufacturers from 
antitrust liabilities even if it had not really imposed such export restraints.153  However, 
other things being equal, the Chinese government will have a stronger incentive to 
defend its own firms in cases of genuine state-led export cartels, as the failure to do so 
will ruin its reputation and hurt its credibility among the domestic exporters.  Thus, the 
cost for the Chinese exporters to solicit support from the Chinese government should 
be lower if they had been compelled by the government to fix prices.    
 
Moreover, from the perspective of the Chinese government, the cost that it faces in 
providing such supporting statements is lower in the case of a genuine state-led export 
cartel than a sham one.  When the Chinese government admits to imposing export 
restraints, such an admission can trigger the violations of the WTO commitments.  
However, if China had imposed such restraints, then the importing country may 
challenge China’s conduct on the basis of the factual evidence, and the US does not 
necessarily need to rely on China’s admission in court to win the WTO case.  In other 
words, China could be found liable regardless of its admission in court.  In the WTO 
raw material case, the United States pointed to a series of evidence such as the laws and 
regulations in China, and China’s admission was only used as additional evidence to 
strengthen its case.154  On the other hand, if China had never actually imposed any 
export restraints to coordinate with export cartels, then its admissions in court will be 
the only evidence of its violation WTO commitments.  As such, China would not be 
found liable for its WTO violations but for its statements in court.  Given the same 
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penalty that China would face in the WTO proceeding, China’s admission in a US court 
will increase its likelihood of being penalized more significantly in the case of a sham 
state-led export cartel than a genuine one.  Accordingly, the cost of signaling is lower 
if China has indeed imposed export restraints than if it was just trying to shield the 
Chinese firms from antitrust liabilities by crafting false statements post-hoc.  
 
iii. Weighing Between Trade and Antitrust Remedies  
Although the Chinese government’s official declaration in a US court could send a 
useful signal indicating the existence of compulsion, the United States’ optimal strategy 
is also contingent on other factors.  In dealing with Chinese export cartels, the United 
States is faced with two options: it could seek help via a multilateral treaty network 
such as the WTO, or it could bring antitrust actions against the Chinese companies.  
The former is arguably a more efficient mechanism for resolution.  First, antitrust 
litigations in the United States could be initiated by both public and private actors.  
Private enforcement of antitrust litigations will likely involve piecemeal and 
uncoordinated efforts that aim to maximize the plaintiffs’ gains from litigation rather 
than the social welfare of the United States.  Second, antitrust cases often involve 
lengthy discovery, thus putting heavy strains on the judicial resources.  In comparison, 
trade cases involve centralized and coordinated efforts of the US executive branch, and 
these cases are usually resolved much more quickly in the WTO proceedings than the 
antitrust lawsuits.    
 
At the same time, these two channels of remedies seem mutually exclusive.  The 
success of a WTO proceeding hinges on proof of China imposing export restraints, 
whereas the success of the antitrust proceeding hinges on proof of the absence of any 
government restraint (i.e., the cartel is voluntary).  In the vitamin C case, the United 
States did not directly challenge China’s trading practice of vitamin C.  However, as 
elaborated in Section II(iii) above,  the United States government filed a complaint with 
the WTO in 2009, alleging that the Chinese government had imposed export restraint 
on a number of raw materials.155  The US Trade Representatives used the MOFCOM’s 
amicus brief in the vitamin C case as evidence of its trade violations.  Therefore, if the 
US court holds that the vitamin C cartel is voluntary, this would contradict the position 
of the US Trade Representative and risk undermining its case in the WTO.   
 
As it turned out, the United States won the raw materials case in the WTO proceeding, 
even though the appellate panel voided the findings about the MOFCOM’s amicus brief 
and decided that the case based upon other evidence.156  As the trade claims have been 
settled, the US courts need not worry about the spillover effects of this antitrust decision 
on the United States’ trade claims.  Still, if the US court denies granting immunity to 
the Chinese manufacturers, it may have implications on foreign relations.  After the 
District Court refused to defer to the statements of the MOFCOM, the Chinese 
government made several official statements to the US government and US courts 
reiterating that the US government should respect comity.157  In 2013, Shang Ming, the 
Director General of the Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the MOFCOM, expressed “deep 
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dissatisfaction” about the District Court’s ruling, which he believes “shows disrespect 
for China.”158  Shang Ming termed the verdict “unfair,” “inappropriate,” and “wrong,” 
and reportedly stated that, if the verdict stands, “the international community will have 
concerns, and eventually rising disputes may in turn hurt the interest of the United 
States.”159  These statements sent a message to the United States that a refusal to defer 
to the MOFCOM’s statements may lead to more disputes between the two nations, 
which could have adverse consequences on their relationship with China.   
 
Figure 1 uses a model of a sequential game to illustrate the dynamics between the 
United States and China on the issue of deference.  The rules of the game give the first 
move to the United States, which is shown as the initial node of the game.  The United 
States decides between two choices: whether or not to give deference to the Chinese 
government’s interpretation of its own law.  If the United States refuses to give 
deference to the Chinese government, the Chinese government then can have two 
options: it could decide to do nothing or it could retaliate with trade sanction against 
the United States.  For the sake of simplification, this model also assumes the payoffs 
for both parties based on the factual circumstances of the case.160  First, the United 
States will be able to receive the highest payoffs if it refuses to give deference to the 
Chinese government and the Chinese government does not respond with any action.  In 
this scenario, the United States can recover damages from Chinese manufacturers. 
Second, China will receive the highest payoff if the US court gives conclusive 
deference.  In this scenario, the Chinese manufacturers will be exempt from the antitrust 
liabilities and the United States will not be able to recover any damages from Chinese 
firms.  Third, the United States will receive the lowest payoff if the United States 
refuses to give deference to China and China retaliates with trade measures.  A trade 
war causes severe damages to the trade relations between these two nations and the loss 
to the United States outweighs the damages that it could recoup from the antitrust suit.  
China will also receive the lowest payoff in this scenario because in addition to antitrust 
damages, the trade war results in further damages to China.   
 
As the United States moves first, we start by analyzing its reasoning process.  The 
United States will determine what China will do when given the move and then reason 
backwards before deciding whether to grant the deference.  Hence, we look, as the 
United States would, at the choice that China would face in the event that the United 
States denies deference.  At that point, China must simply weigh between retaliation 
and inaction.  Clearly, the second choice dominates the first, and China would choose 
not to retaliate.  Now that we know how China will move if given the chance, we can 
truncate the decision tree and eliminate the strategy that we know that China will not 
adopt—that is, we know that China will not retaliate even if the United States denies 
deference.  The United States can then easily see the consequences of giving deference 
or not.  Because it will receive a higher payoff if it refuses deference than if it grants 
deference, the United States’ optimal strategy is not to defer to the Chinese government.  
   
 
Figure 1: The Game between the United States and China 
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On the other hand, if the Chinese government makes a credible threat of a trade war, 
then the United States will anticipate that China will not choose a strategy of inaction 
if the United States denies deference.  As such, the United States is left with two 
choices: either it gives deference, or it gives no deference and China retaliates.  Clearly, 
the United States is better off deferring to the Chinese government.  Thus, if China 
could credibly change the United States’ perception of its response after the fact, the 
Chinese government could change the response strategy of the United States.  This 
shows why it might be in the interests of China to launch a vigorous protest against a 
refusal to grant deference to its statements.  The louder the message that it sends, the 
more severe the penalty that it threatens upon the United States, and the stronger the 
reputation that China has built in imposing retaliatory trade measures, the more likely 
that the United States will grant deference to the Chinese government’s statements.  
This also explains why the Second Circuit highlighted the Chinese government’s strong 
reactions in its decision.161  The appellate court seems to believe that  a refusal to defer 
to the Chinese government might provoke retaliation and result in a worse outcome for 
the United States.  Thus, by deciding to defer to the Chinese government, the Second 
Circuit dispensed with the need to adopt an intensive fact-specific approach, and 
deference became a shortcut for the court to reach its preferred outcome.  Yet the US 
executive branch holds a different view.  In its amicus brief submitted to the US 
Supreme Court, the Solicitor General and the DOJ argued that “unlike a statement from 
the [e]xecutive [b]ranch, a foreign sovereign’s objection to a suit does not, in itself, 
necessarily indicate that the case will harm US foreign relations.”162  As the executive 
branch urged the court to take a more fact-specific approach rather than granting 
conclusive deference to the MOFCOM’s statements, this suggests that it does not 
believe that the MOFCOM’s protest to the vitamin C case is a credible threat to the 
foreign relationship between the two countries.   
   
The Second Circuit also mentioned a counterfactual that if the Chinese government did 
not file an amicus brief in the litigation, the District Court’s “careful and thorough 
treatment of evidence before it” would have been entirely appropriate.163  As shown in 
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the analysis above, from the standpoint of the United States, two mutually exclusive 
remedies are being weighed here—trade or antitrust.  If the United States decides to 
work on the trade route, then it seems best to refrain from suing the Chinese 
manufacturers on the basis of conflicting antitrust grounds.  Thus, regardless of the 
Chinese government’s appearance in the court, the Court should abstain from 
exercising jurisdiction if the trade remedy is less costly and more effective.  In fact, it 
will make sense for the United States to stay the antitrust action, pending the outcome 
of the WTO proceeding, similar to the court’s decision in Resco Product. 164 Thus, the 
government’s appearance should not be a prerequisite for the court to grant immunity 
to the foreign exporters, as will be further elaborated in Part (IV) below.  
 
Another issue raised by the Second Circuit’s decision is whether a foreign 
government’s statements should always be deemed conclusive and hence the foreign 
exporters given immunity.  In its petition to the US Supreme Court, the plaintiffs 
interpreted the ruling by the Second Circuit as amounting to conclusive evidence to a 
foreign sovereign “simply by virtue of appearance.”165  However, one could conceive 
of a situation in which if trade remedy is not readily available, or  more costly than 
antitrust remedy,  then it might make sense for the United States to pressure China to 
abandon the state-led export cartels via the antitrust route. Thus, deference should not 
be absolute when the foreign government appears in US courts.  It ultimately turns on 
weighing the cost and benefit analysis of potential remedies.   
 
As China acknowledged in the raw materials case in the WTO, the country had already 
abandoned its export restraints on vitamin C by 2008.166  Therefore, the United States 
has no interest in launching a trade challenge against China for the imposition of export 
restraints on vitamin C.  On the other hand, the US victims in the vitamin C case would 
remain uncompensated unless they sought remedy through antitrust litigation.  In such 
a scenario, the US court may prefer to adopt a fact-specific approach rather than to 
conclusively defer to the MOFCOM’s statements.  Moreover, the US executive branch, 
who specializes in handling foreign relations for the US government, does not seem to 
believe that an adverse ruling to the vitamin C producers would harm the relationship 
between the two countries.167   Its  amicus brief criticized the Second Circuit for its 
failure to consider other factual circumstances that contradict with the MOFCOM’s 
statements and nudged the Supreme Court to adopt a fact-specific approach in 
determining deference.168  
 
IV. The Economic Analysis of Comity  
The second unanswered question in the vitamin C case relates to the proper balancing 
test to apply in comity analysis.  More specifically, whether true conflict, which is part 
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of the balancing tests applied by the Second Circuit, is a prerequisite for the court to 
decide whether to abstain from jurisdiction on the ground of comity.   Comity in itself 
is an elusive concept.  As the US Supreme Court long stated in Hilton v. Guyot over a 
century ago: “Comity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on 
the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.”169  Rather, “[i]t is 
the recognition which one nations allows within its territory to the legislative, executive 
or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its law.”170  The Supreme Court provided further clarification to the 
concept in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiaele v. U.S. District Court of 
Southern District of Iowa, where it states that the doctrine “is not just a vague political 
concern favoring international cooperation when it is in our interest to do so [but r]ather 
it is a principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systematic value of reciprocal 
tolerance and goodwill.”171  The broader principles of comity were also stated in JP 
Morgan Chase Bank, in which the Supreme Court stated that “Whatever its precise 
contours, international comity is clearly concerned with maintaining amicable working 
relationships between nations, a shorthand for good neighbourliness, common courtesy 
and mutual respect between those who labour in adjoining judicial vineyards.” 172  
Despite these attempts to clarify the doctrine of comity, the exact meaning of the comity 
doctrine remains subject to intense debate.173  In practice, when a court should abstain 
from exercising jurisdiction on comity ground is not entirely clear.174 
 
i. The Controversy of the Balancing Test 
In the vitamin C case, the Second Circuit relied upon a ten-factor balancing test 
following the decisions by the Ninth Circuit and the Third Circuit.175  Thus far,  the 
Supreme Court has not adopted any of the balancing tests.176  In Hartford Fire, the 
Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether there was in fact a true 
conflict between foreign and domestic law. 177   In that case, a group of reinsurers based 
in London argued that their conduct of fixing commercial insurance policy terms was 
“perfectly consistent” with British laws, even though such conduct was prohibited in 
the United States.178  The Supreme Court identified no true conflict in that case, noting 
that the British law did not require the defendants to violate the US laws.179   According 
to the Supreme Court, true conflict means that “compliance with the laws of both 
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countries [must have been] impossible.”180  Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hartford Fire, the Second Circuit has mostly focused on the first factor in the balancing 
test—that is, whether there is a true conflict between domestic law and foreign law.  
However, it also emphasizes that other factors are important in its consideration.  But 
other circuits have considered different versions of the balancing test.181  In its petition 
to the US Supreme Court, the plaintiffs argue that the comity doctrine is far from settled 
and that the “comity balancing test” is “a recent, amorphous and anomalous abstention 
doctrine.”182   
 
The decision in Hartford Fire is controversial and many scholars have criticized the 
court for ignoring a modern trend that allows for more robust interpretation of 
comity.183  Waller suggests that Hartford Fire should be construed more narrowly—
comity could be based on the other factors outlined in the cases but litigants cannot rely 
upon the conflict between national policies unless such conflict rises to the level of 
outright compulsion.184  Moreover, the US Supreme Court’s more recent decision in F. 
Hoffman-Laroche, Ltd. v. Empagran supports a more expansive interpretation of the 
comity doctrine that is consistent with the one suggested by Waller.185  Indeed, some 
courts have suggested that Hartford Fire should not be read rigidly and have held that 
true conflict is not a prerequisite for invoking comity analysis.186  The Second Circuit 
left this issue open.187  
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The difficulty for courts in reaching a consensus on the balancing test lies in the fact 
that comity analysis is inherently a jurisdictional rule of reason analysis.  Accordingly, 
the optimal application of the comity test should be firmly grounded in the specific facts 
of the case.  In fact, in the context of state-led export cartel cases, the sole focus on the 
conflict of law between domestic and foreign laws for the comity analysis is misguided.  
Such an approach overlooks the fact that the impetus for foreign sovereigns to engage 
in export cartels are often the hostile antidumping measures threatened by the importing 
countries.  As such, the importing country may even have an interest in encouraging 
the exporting countries to impose export restraints, as illustrated by the US’ response 
to Japanese automobile export cartels in the 1980s.     
   
ii. A Robust Comity Test 
To explore the complicated dynamics that exist in state-led export cartel cases, it is 
important to first understand that in those cases, the antitrust issues are often closely 
entangled with the trade policies of both the exporting and importing countries.  
Antidumping law prohibits imports sold at less than “fair value” if the imports 
materially injure a domestic industry. 188   While antitrust law in general protects 
consumer interests by encouraging low pricing, antidumping law condemns such low 
pricing in order to shield domestic industries from foreign competition. 189   Thus 
antidumping not only creates a trading tension, but also tension with its domestic 
antitrust policy. 190   In fact, the conflict we observe between a foreign exporting 
country’s trade policy and the US’ antitrust law is deeply rooted in the tension between 
the US’ domestic antitrust law and its antidumping measures.  Therefore, if the United 
States decides on certain occasions that its trade policy should trump its antitrust policy, 
the original conflict between the exporting country’s trade policy and the US antitrust 
law disappears.  In such circumstance, it is incentive-compatible for both the United 
States and the exporting country to support the export cartels.  In the following sections, 
I will first explain why the exporting country has the incentives to get involved in an 
export cartel, and then analyze the optimal response from the United States.  
 
(1) Antidumping As The Impetus for Export Cartels 
While cartels are consistently outlawed in established competition law regimes, 
virtually all jurisdictions tolerate export cartels.191  For instance, the United States 
Webb-Pomerene Act expressly allows export cartels that operate exclusively in foreign 
markets.192 Under the Export Trading Company Act of 1982, US firms could apply in 
advance for certification that their export cartel would be exempt from antitrust 
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violations in the United States.193  For the exporting country, its incentive to exempt 
export cartels is obvious: the loss of consumer welfare is borne by consumers of the 
importing country, while the producers from the exporting country can reap the gains 
of monopoly rents.194 As export cartels poses a classic externality problem for the open 
economy, the benefits for international cooperation are substantial. 195   However, 
industrialized states have tried in vain to reach such an agreement, and until now, the 
WTO does not have a mandate to deal with export cartels.196 
 
When a foreign government becomes involved in the creation or implementation of a 
single-country export cartel, profit maximization may only be one of the driving 
factors.197  Indeed, a foreign government might react to the antidumping measures of 
the importing country by imposing export restraints or encouraging domestic firms to 
agree among themselves to restrict output or raise prices.198  China offers a prime 
example.  Antidumping is one of the major risks that China faces in participating in the 
world trade system.  Since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, China has become one 
of the most important players in world trade.199  But the exponential growth in Chinese 
exports also dealt a shock to the world trade system, causing massive job losses for 
importing countries.200  Meanwhile,  excess capacity is a perennial challenge facing the 
Chinese economy.201  Since the mid-1990s, there was excess capacity in sixty-one of 
China’s ninety-four major categories of industrial products and capacity utilization rate 
was below fifty percent in the thirty-five of them.202 A natural consequence of the 
excess capacity issues is “excessive competition.” 203  The intense price competition 
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among Chinese exporters sparked accusation from foreign counties that Chinese 
companies are dumping their goods into the foreign markets.204  This led to a spate of 
foreign antidumping actions against Chinese exporters.205  From 2002 to June 2011, 
China was the target of 21 WTO complaints.206  
 
To tackle the overcapacity problems, the Chinese government has implemented a 
number of industrial policy measures.207  Most of these government measures have 
taken the form of “industrial self-discipline,” whereby major companies in a specific 
industry reach agreements to limit competition in order to stabilize the economy.208  
Trade associations, many of which were converted from government ministries, then 
play a pivotal role in facilitating such cartels.209  Notably, China is not the first country 
to use export cartels to address overcapacity problems.  In the late 1970s, the Japanese 
government adopted a program of adjustment assistance for its distressed industries.  
One of its primary tools for adjustment is cartelization of such industries, a tool that it 
had used since 1953.210  At that time Japanese exports were heavily cartelized.  In 1977, 
there were 86 officially registered export cartels, accounting for 20-30% of all exports 
from Japan.211  By the mid-1980s, the Japanese government had established 64 separate 
cartel systems authorized by 46 separate cartel exemption statutes.212 Similar to the 
Chinese view, the Japanese government believed that cartels were a good way to 
eliminate excess capacity by allowing troubled companies to cooperate to solve their 
mutual problems.213  
 
In 2003, the Chinese government imposed a requirement that exporters of thirty-six 
goods were required to submit their export contracts to their respective trade 
associations for approval before export.214  According to  the MOFCOM, the main 
reason for imposing this new requirement was to “make active efforts to avoid anti-
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dumping sanctions imposed by foreign countries on China’s exports.”215  Vitamin C is 
one of these industries.216  According to the judicial record in the vitamin C case, 
China’s share of vitamin imports to the United States rose from 60% in 1997 to 80% 
by 2002. 217   And the vitamin C defendants had achieved over 60% share in the 
worldwide market in 2001.218  At that time there was growing concern within the 
Chinese government that western countries would soon adopt antidumping measures 
against Chinese vitamin C products. 219   Thus, the Chinese government faced a 
dilemma: if it regulated the exports of Chinese products, it risked exposing Chinese 
exporters to antitrust suits for conducting price fixing in the United States; it also risked 
violating the GATT commitments for imposing such export restraints.  If, on the other 
hand, the Chinese government did not regulate the exports, there would likely to be 
excessive competition among domestic exporters, thus exposing the Chinese exporters 
to potential antidumping allegations from the United States.    
 
(2) Using Export Cartel As A Trade Policy 
Export cartels in general pose an externality on the importing country and harm its 
consumers.  All else being equal, the importing country will be better off imposing 
import restraints (such as tariffs or import quotas) on the goods rather than allowing 
export cartels.220  This is because in the case of export cartels, the increased rent accrues 
to the foreign producers, whereas the importing country can recoup some of the loss of 
consumer welfare from the revenue of tariffs or duties levied on foreign producers.221  
Despite its harm to consumers, export cartels can potentially benefit domestic 
producers.  During a trade crisis, the government may feel the pressure to protect 
domestic producers from foreign competition.  The United States has used foreign 
export cartels as a tool for its trade policy in the past.222   In the 1980s, the US auto 
industry faced severe challenges from Japanese imports. 223   The Japanese auto 
manufacturers quickly expanded into the US market, gaining nearly 21% of the market 
share by early 1981.224  Meanwhile, the three largest US auto makers all experienced 
financial hardships, with productions and sales declined dramatically. 225 
Unemployment in the auto industry soared—over 300,000 auto workers became jobless 
and another 500,000 working in the auto supply industries lost their jobs.226   The 
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economic threat posed by the rising tide of the Japanese imports led to intensive 
lobbying from the auto manufacturers and their unions petitioning for relief from 
Japanese imports.227 
 
However, the United States International Trade Commission (ITC), which serves as an 
advisory body to the President and the Congress on trade issues, denied the industry’s 
petition.228  In a close decision (3 to 2), the majority found that although foreign imports 
posed serious injury to the domestic industry, they were not the primary cause for the 
industry’s problems. 229   Rather, they attributed the industry’s failures to other factors, 
such as economic recession and the shift in consumer demand for smaller cars.230  At 
the same time, Congress was threatening to impose a legislative quota on Japanese auto 
imports, a move that would violate the US obligations under GATT.231  President 
Reagan, who publicly endorsed free trade and free market, succumbed to the pressures 
of the Congress to protect the domestic industries from Japanese competition at the 
expense of US consumers.232  Yet without a positive ITC decision, President Reagan 
lacked the statutory authority to impose trade restraints.233  The Reagan administration 
then came up with an awkward solution: trying to convince the Japanese government 
to voluntarily limit their exports.  Such a solution would satisfy the domestic political 
demand without violating the GATT obligations.234   
 
The Japanese government, on the other hand, was faced with a dilemma.  It could either 
choose to impose export restraints and extract more profits from US consumers, or it 
could choose to take no action and let the Japanese manufacturers continue to compete 
and expand into the US market, in which case the US Congress would be very likely to 
impose stringent quotas on Japanese imports. 235 The former choice obviously seems 
more desirable, except that the voluntary export restraints (VER) risked violating its 
obligation under GATT and it could also face antitrust lawsuits in the United States. 236  
But since it was the US government that requested the VER from Japan, the United 
States would not challenge it under GATT.237 Thus, the only remaining concern for the 
Japanese government was the risk of antitrust violations.  During rounds of discussion, 
the Japanese government sought assurance from the Reagan administration that their 
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VER system would not give rise to violations of US antitrust law.238  In a response to a 
letter by the then Japanese Ambassador in May 1981, William French Smith, the then-
US Attorney General, replied that the Department of Justice believed that the VER 
system would be “viewed as having been compelled by the Japanese government,” and 
thus it “would not give rise to violations of United States antitrust laws.” 239 Moreover, 
Smith assured that the DOJ believed that the American courts interpreting the antitrust 
laws in such a situation would likely so hold.240   
 
From a game theory perspective, the negotiation between the United States and the 
Japanese government could be modeled as a Nash bargaining problem. 241   A key 
determinant of a Nash bargaining solution is the outside option, which are the payoffs 
for the parties in the event that the negotiation breaks down.242 To establish the two 
parties’ outside option, Figure 2 models the two countries’ interaction outside of 
bargaining as a sequential game.  This game has two players: the importing country 
(the United States) and the exporting country (Japan).  In this game, the two countries 
take turns in making their moves, and they can observe the move of the other country 
before they make the next move.  Thus, each country must consider how the other 
country will respond if it makes a particular move, which will in turn affect their own 
future action.  Each country will decide their current move on the basis of calculation 
of future consequences.   
 
Figure 2: The Game Between the United States and Japan 
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Upon the threat of trade sanctions from the United States, the Japanese government is 
confronted with two choices: it can impose export VER (i.e., equivalent to organizing 
an export cartel); or it can impose no restraint on exports and let the free market run its 
course.  If Japan imposes VER, the Japanese firms become vulnerable to antitrust 
allegations from the United States. To keep things simple, the model assumes that if 
the Japanese government imposes VER, the chance of the Japanese firms being 
challenged in the United States for antitrust violations is p ( p>0.5). 243  The United 
States then has two options: it could either grant antitrust immunity on comity grounds 
or deny such immunity.244 On the other hand, if the Japanese government does not 
impose VER, the model assumes that Japanese firms will continue to compete fiercely 
and expand into the US market, and that the US Congress will impose trade sanctions 
on Japanese auto imports.  For the sake of simplicity, the model also assumes the 
payoffs to the parties based on the factual circumstances at that time.245   
 
To determine its optimal strategy, the United States will look ahead and reason back to 
determine how the Japanese government will react in this game.  If the United States 
denies immunity, the total expected payoff to Japan will be (p * -2)+((1-p) * 0)= -2p.  
As p>0.5, the total expected payoff for Japan will be less than -1.  In that circumstance, 
the Japanese government would be better off not to impose the VER in the first place.  
On the other hand, if the United States grants immunity, the payoff for Japan is higher 
if it imposes VER, as it will be able to obtain higher profits from trade and avoid 
potential trade sanctions from the US Congress.  The Japanese government would 
choose to impose VER in such circumstances. 
 
Now that we know how Japan will move if given the chance, we can truncate the 
decision tree and eliminate the strategy that we know Japan will not adopt—that is, we 
know Japan will not impose VER if the United States denies immunity.  The United 
States then can easily see the consequences of granting immunity or not.  Clearly, the 
United States prefers to grant immunity, as it will receive a higher payoff than if the 
US Congress imposes sanction on Japanese firms.  Note that such a choice is valid 
regardless of the United States’ payoff if it denies immunity.  Even if the United States’ 
payoffs are higher if it denies immunity than if it grants immunity, the United States 
would still be better off granting immunity, as otherwise the Japanese firms would not 
impose VER in the first place.   
 
As shown in Figure 2, if both the United States and Japan do rollback analysis to choose 
their optimal strategies, the equilibrium is that the Japanese government imposes VER 
and the United States grants immunity to the Japanese government.  While this strategy 
will yield the best payoffs for both countries under this sequential game, they both have 
an interest in avoiding the costs and uncertainties of engaging in protracted and costly 
antitrust disputes later.  In other words, there is an excess value to be achieved from the 
bargaining between these two countries, and the surplus from cooperation is obvious.  
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To reach an agreement, Japan needed to get assurance from the Reagan administration 
that the US government would grant immunity and that the US court would follow suit.  
The letter from the DOJ to the Japanese government served this exact purpose; without 
this commitment, the two countries would not have been able to reach a cooperative 
outcome.    
 
 
With the blessing of the Reagan administration, the Japanese auto VER lasted about 
almost four years from 1981 until 1985.246  Partly due to the restrictions of the Japanese 
imports, the United States auto industry experienced a dramatic recovery and quickly 
returned to profitability.247  As imports shrank, US auto manufacturers also regained 
their market shares, significantly increasing their production in the United States.248  
This generated record profits for the domestic auto industry.249  As the VER restricted 
the number of imports and reduced the competition among domestic and foreign auto 
manufacturers, this allowed both domestic and foreign automakers to substantially 
increase prices.  250  But the successful recovery of the auto industry also came at a dear 
price for US consumers.251  At the same time, even though the outcome was not one 
that maximizes the total social welfare for the United States, it is arguably the best 
response the US executives could have made given the political and economic 
circumstances at that time.  
 
The above analysis demonstrates that when the interests of the exporting country and 
the importing country are in harmony, whether the exporting country has actually 
compelled the cartel or even whether the foreign sovereign is involved in the cartel 
becomes irrelevant.  The optimal strategy for the United States not only depends on the 
payoffs to the United States, but also on the strategy of the exporting country who will 
make the first move in this game.  The strategy of the exporting country in turn depends 
on its payoffs, which vary depending on the trade policy of the United States, as well 
as many other factors such as its chance of getting challenged for antitrust violations in 
the United States, the expected antitrust litigation cost and the expected trade loss if the 
United States imposes sanction.  Thus, the optimal strategy for the United States is not 
fixed at a specific outcome.  Rather, it is a complicated assessment of various factors 
including antitrust, trade, and domestic politics.  As it is a sequential game, it requires 
players to consider the future consequences of their current moves before choosing their 
actions.  Consequently, the comity analysis needs to anticipate these changing 
circumstance in politics and accommodate such flexibility.   
 
The US’ response to the Japanese automobile cartel in the 1980s is not the first time 
that the United States has used antitrust as a strategic tool for trade policy.  In the 1960s, 
in anticipation of hostile congressional action that would have established stringent 
quotas for steels imports, the US government negotiated directly with European steel 
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producers and concluded a series of voluntary restraint agreements with them.252  The 
US government bypassed their governmental counterparts and directly encouraged the 
European producers to organize export cartels. 253   The government’s action was 
subsequently challenged in court in Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. 
Rogers. 254  The plaintiff argued that the agreements constituted a violation of the 
Sherman Act and the existing Congressional trade legislation preempted the president’s 
power in the field.255 The District Court upheld the steel agreements, but noted that the 
President had no authority to grant immunity to the foreign exporters participating in 
the voluntary agreement.256    
 
The US executive branch learnt a lesson from Consumers Union and changed its 
approach of dealing with trade crisis, which is why the Reagan administration 
encouraged the Japanese government to impose voluntary export restraints on its 
automobiles.257  Subsequently, the US government issued similar assurances to the 
Japanese government in connection with the imposition of VER on semiconductors 
exported from Japan.258  President Reagan also used similar tactics when negotiating 
with a number of exporting countries on steel imports.259  For instance, in 1985, the 
United States effectuated a trade agreement with Australia by allowing the latter to 
impose restraints on its steel exports.260  In 2005, the United States and China signed 
an agreement in which China promised to place VER on Chinese textiles and apparel 
goods in order to avoid US import duties after a surge of those Chinese imports to the 
United States.261  
 
 
The above examples demonstrate that the US government has often engaged in 
bargaining with foreign sovereigns to reach optimal solutions with trade and antitrust.  
However, foreign sovereigns may sometimes unilaterally impose VER on their exports 
without first reaching an agreement with the United States.  For instance, in the vitamin 
C case, there was no bargaining between the United States and China ex ante as to 
whether China should voluntarily impose export restraints on its vitamin C products.  
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Unlike the Japanese export cartel cases, the US government did not have a strong 
interest in pushing up the export prices for vitamin C products in order to shield 
domestic producers from foreign competition. 262   On the contrary, the US federal 
agencies cracked down a large global vitamin cartels in the late 1990s, ending a decade-
long conspiracy among major vitamin producers. 263  Meanwhile, even if the US 
executive branch has given assurances to foreign sovereigns on antitrust immunity, 
victims of alleged export cartels may still challenge the collusive conduct of the foreign 
exporters in US courts.  As illustrated in the Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith 
Radio Corp. (Matsushita Electric) below, US courts sometimes deviate from the 
position of the executive branch, despite the latter’s active participation in the judicial 
proceeding.  
 
(3) Judicial Response to Japanese Export Cartel 
In Matsushita Electric, two US TV manufacturers brought a case against Japanese TV 
manufacturers for creating a cartel in order to drive its US competitors out of the 
market.264  The defendants argued that their conduct should be immune from antitrust 
violations because the MITI had “mandated agreements fixing minimum export prices” 
to avoid antidumping liability and retaliatory trade barriers against Japanese goods.265  
In a statement submitted to court, the MITI admitted that it had directed the Japanese 
cartel.266  Moreover, the agency claimed that it could penalize those firms that failed to 
comply with its directives by using its authority to allocate foreign exchange under the 
certain foreign trade control laws.267  This position was supported by the US Solicitor 
General and the DOJ, who urged the court to give the MITI’s statements as conclusive 
weight.268  As such, the executive branch sent a clear signal to the court that it should 
abstain from exercising its jurisdiction in this case.    
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Yet the Third Circuit refused to defer to the statements by the Japanese government and 
the US government.269  Rather, it took a fact-specific approach similar to the one 
adopted by the District Court in the vitamin C case. 270   Because the Third Circuit was 
not able to find that the MITI had imposed a mandatory price restraint on the exporters, 
it held that the Japanese regulatory scheme “merely provide an umbrella” allowing for 
the domestic antitrust exemption.271  More specifically, the court found ample evidence 
demonstrating that the defendants departed from the agreed prices in an attempt to 
conceal their actions from the MITI.272  Further, the court was unable to identify any 
evidence that shows that the defendant’s collusion originated with the compulsion of 
the Japanese government; in fact, it found that the defendant’s conduct violated 
Japanese domestic law. 273   The case was appealed to the US Supreme Court. 274  
Regrettably, the Supreme Court did not consider the compulsion issue in its final 
ruling.275   
 
Similar to the vitamin C court, the Third Circuit got bogged down in the complicated 
factual inquiry of whether compulsion existed in this case.   The court failed to realize 
that the Japanese imposition of VER is not a static decision; rather, it is a dynamic 
decision involving the trade policy and domestic politics of the United States.  The 
United States did not act in a vacuum—its decision would have an impact on how the 
Japanese government would act in the first place.  Thus, a simple focus on the antitrust 
case at issue risks missing the bigger picture of the dynamics between the United States 
and Japan.  The Third Circuit would have been better off deferring to the position taken 
by the executive branch, who had submitted an amicus brief in support of the Japanese 
government’s position.  In fact, US courts have traditionally accorded  a high level of 
deference to the executive branch in cases involving foreign relations, as it is presumed 
to possess more expertise and is in a superior position to determine strategies for the 
United States in such cases.276   
 
Notably, the executive branch’s objection to conclusive deference to the MOFCOM’s 
statements in the vitamin C case is a striking contrast with its stance in Matsushita 
Electric, where it strongly advocated for conclusive deference to the Japanese 
government’s statements.277  While this legal inconsistency and logical incoherence 
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may seem puzzling, it becomes understandable once the underlying political and 
economic circumstances are considered.  Although the United States had an interest in 
pushing up import prices to protect domestic auto industries in the face of growing 
competition from Japan, it has no incentive to do so in the case of vitamin C, a market 
already dominated by Chinese producers.278  In Matsushita Electric, the DOJ was also 
not shy in acknowledging the executive branch’s protectionist goal: “In a system of 
international trade where the United States can be found negotiating for certain export 
restraints, failure to recognize a limited sovereign compulsion exception to the Sherman 
Act necessarily would ‘interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the 
political branches.”279  This reveals that the underlying logic of the position of the 
executive branch has not been the law; rather, it has been politics.   
 
V. Conclusion and Implications 
This article examines two issues that were left open by the Second Circuit in the vitamin 
C case.  It demonstrates that there is a strong economic rationale for deferring to the 
statements of foreign sovereigns about their interpretation of their own laws.  However, 
the foreign government’s appearance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for granting immunity to foreign firms.  The optimal response of the United States 
should also depend on the feasibility and cost of alternative remedies.  Indeed, in export 
cartel cases, the issues of antitrust law are often closely entangled with trade policy and 
domestic politics in both the exporting and importing countries.  An optimal response 
to state-led export cartels not only turns on the factual inquiries of conflict of law, but 
also its impact on trade policy and domestic politics in both the exporting and importing 
countries.  Comity analysis therefore needs to be robust enough to accommodate and 
adapt to the changing economic and political circumstances.  The findings of this article 
suggest that US courts should accord a high level of deference to the executive branch 
in cases involving state-lead export cartels.   
 
More specifically, this article demonstrates that several factors, often overlooked by 
courts in export cartel cases, are important in the application of comity-based defense:  
First, has the executive branch brought suit against the foreign firms for antitrust 
violations?  If so, this is an indication that the executive branch has determined that the 
challenged conduct is more harmful to the United States than the potential injury the 
antitrust action might have on foreign relations.280  The comity-based defense should 
therefore be inapplicable in such circumstances. Second, has the executive branch 
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negotiated with the foreign sovereign to impose export restraints to accommodate the 
desires of the United States?  If so, then US courts should refrain from reaching a ruling 
that might undermine the efforts of the US administration, as shown in the cases 
involving Japanese export cartels.  Third, has the executive branch tried to persuade the 
foreign sovereign to abandon export restraints via diplomatic means or through other 
multilateral treaty networks, such as the WTO?   If so, US courts should refrain from 
making decisions that might impede such efforts.  For example, US courts could choose 
to suspend the antitrust suit pending the resolution of such disputes through diplomatic 
means or trade remedies, as the court did in Resco Products.  Fourth, if the executive 
branch has not taken any action through trade or antitrust, would a refusal to defer to 
the foreign sovereign’s statements in court have repercussions on foreign relation?  As 
the executive branch specializes in handling foreign affairs, US courts are well-advised 
to solicit opinions from the executive branch and defer to its opinion, as the Supreme 
Court did in the vitamin C case.   
 
The application of the above framework of analysis reveals three factors that are crucial 
for the assessment of the optimal strategy for the United States in the vitamin C case.  
First, although the vitamin C case was closely entangled with the raw material case that 
the United States launched against China in the WTO, the trade claims had been settled 
and there would not be any spillover effects of the vitamin C decision on the trade case.   
Further, as China abandoned its export restraints on the vitamin C products in 2008, the 
United States no longer has an interest in pursuing after China via trade remedies.  
Second, unlike the Japanese export cartel cases, the United States did not seem to have 
an interest in pushing up vitamin C prices to protect domestic producers from foreign 
competition.  Quite the contrary, the US’ crackdown on the global vitamin cartels in 
the 1990s suggests that the United States has long endorsed a vigorous antitrust policy 
in this vitamin industry.  Third, despite the protest of the MOFCOM against the District 
Court’s refusal to defer to its statements, the executive branch did not seem to believe 
that such protest exerts a credible threat on the China-US relationship. Not surprisingly, 
the amicus brief by the Solicitor General and the DOJ leans toward a more fact-specific 
approach rather than a conclusive deference to the MOFCOM’s statements.  The 
Supreme Court would be wise to heed this advice.  
 
 
 
 
  
